Why knowing when a game ends destroys the possibility of cooperation between players
In short: In a one-off interaction, players often act selfishly, leading to inefficient outcomes. When games repeat, the future casts a shadow over the present, enabling cooperation. However, if the end date is fixed and known, this fragile trust unravels, forcing players back into the same cold, self-interested Nash equilibrium.
A repeated game consists of multiple iterations of a base stage game. In a single-shot scenario, such as two gas stations competing on price, the only stable outcome is a Nash equilibrium where both charge their marginal cost, resulting in zero profit. This is inefficient, yet players are trapped by their own self-interest. When the game is repeated, however, the prospect of future interactions allows for reputation-building and the use of trigger strategies, where players punish those who deviate from cooperative behavior.
The duration of the game fundamentally changes the optimal strategy. In infinitely repeated games, or those where the end date is unknown, players can maintain socially optimal equilibria because the threat of future punishment outweighs the immediate gain of acting selfishly. These cooperative outcomes are often supported by 'Folk Theorems,' which characterize the set of possible equilibrium payoffs. For patient players who value future rewards, a wide array of strategies can become stable Nash equilibria.
Conversely, a known, finite time horizon acts as a poison pill for cooperation. Through a process called backward induction, players realize that the final round offers no future to protect, so they must play the stage game's Nash equilibrium. Knowing this, they have no incentive to cooperate in the second-to-last round, a logic that cascades backward to the very first move. This 'unravelling' effect, famously illustrated by the Chainstore paradox, demonstrates that even if multiple equilibria exist, the certainty of an end date forces players to abandon cooperative strategies in favor of the stage game's unique Nash equilibrium.
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- Summary by Intellect · source: Repeated game
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