An 18th-century Spanish general blamed rebellions on bad rulers
Writing between 1726 and 1730, the Marquis of Santa Cruz de Marcenado argued that a people seldom rises up unless its governors are at fault. His prescription for stopping rebellions was clemency and good government, winning the population's heart and love, an idea that still anchors counterinsurgency thinking.
Counterinsurgency means a state's effort to defeat irregular, non-state fighters such as guerrillas or revolutionaries. Wars of this kind are ancient, but Western theory about small wars grew during European colonial expansion, and modern doctrine took shape as empires dissolved. Campaigns mix conventional fighting with political, economic, psychological and civic measures. Because civilians and combatants blur together, governments have chosen between courting the population and terrorising those suspected of backing the rebels.
Santa Cruz's Reflexiones Militares covered spotting early warning signs, preventing uprisings and, failing that, countering them. A century later Thomas Bugeaud, a French commander in the conquest of Algeria, combined intelligence with irregular and psychological warfare, but his punitive raids by fast-moving columns were aimed at the enemy rather than winning over the population, and drew little distinction between civilians and fighters. Later French officers favoured the oil spot method, securing one area and spreading outward.
The strategist Basil Liddell Hart stressed how hard popular insurgencies are to beat. In Napoleonic Spain, French troops routed Spanish armies whenever they fought in regular formations, yet dispersed guerrilla bands wore the occupiers down until Wellington could drive them out. During the First World War, Arab irregulars working with T. E. Lawrence repeatedly struck and vanished into the desert against Ottoman forces that sometimes outnumbered them more than a hundred to one, opening the way for British regulars. As long as rebels keep popular support, Liddell Hart argued, they retain mobility, invisibility and legitimacy.
The French officer David Galula framed four laws. The goal is the population's support rather than territory. Most people stay neutral, and an active friendly minority can sway them. Support can be lost, so civilians must be protected from reprisals. Control should advance area by area, clearing armed opponents, winning residents over and building lasting ties before moving to the next district. Insurgencies do fail, especially when the rebels themselves are unpopular.
Source: Counterinsurgency
