The missile that turned submarines into invulnerable nuclear deterrents
In short: In the mid-1950s, the US Navy faced a dilemma: how to launch a nuclear strike from a moving, submerged submarine. The solution, the Polaris missile, required a radical leap in warhead miniaturization and a shift from volatile liquid fuels to safer, more reliable solid propellant.
The development of the UGM-27 Polaris was catalyzed by the 1956 Project Nobska study. During this anti-submarine research, physicist Edward Teller made a bold, controversial prediction: he claimed that a lightweight, one-megaton hydrogen bomb warhead could be produced within five years. While Los Alamos physicist J. Carson Mark argued for a more conservative half-megaton yield and a longer timeline, the Navy chose to back Teller's ambitious vision.
This decision necessitated a departure from the Army's Jupiter missile project. The Jupiter was a large, liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) weighing approximately 160,000 pounds. The Navy found liquid fuel unsuitable for submarines due to its volatility, the danger of handling cryogenic liquids on ships, and the time-consuming launch preparations. Instead, the Navy sought a smaller, solid-fueled design—estimated to weigh only 30,000 pounds—that could be launched while submerged, making the platform nearly invulnerable to counterattack.
The Polaris program, managed by Rear Admiral W. F. "Red" Raborn's Special Project Office, fundamentally changed military management, leading to the creation of the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) to handle its immense complexity. The missile served as the backbone of the US Navy's nuclear force from 1961 until 1980. It was eventually phased out as technology evolved, with the Poseidon missile taking over much of the fleet starting in 1972, followed by the Trident I in the 1980s.
The strategic impact of Polaris was so profound that it sparked intense inter-service rivalry. As the missile provided a highly survivable deterrent, the Navy began advocating for total responsibility for the US nuclear deterrent, a move contested by the Air Force, which favored the flexible response provided by strategic bombers and land-based ICBMs.
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- Summary by Intellect · source: UGM-27 Polaris
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