How a small brokerage became a Wall Street giant, then collapsed in 1990
In short: Drexel Burnham Lambert began as a small New York brokerage in 1935 and grew into the fifth-largest investment bank in the United States. Its rise and fall, driven by the junk bond market, became one of the defining cautionary tales of 1980s finance and reshaped how Wall Street thinks about risk and rules.
Drexel Burnham Lambert traces its roots to I.W. "Tubby" Burnham, a Wharton graduate who founded Burnham and Company in 1935 with $100,000 of capital, most of it borrowed. The firm grew into one of the more successful brokerages in the country. Its expansion into investment banking was limited, however, by an unwritten industry hierarchy that controlled the order of firm names in advertisements. A smaller firm needed a stronger partner to advance, and in 1973 Burnham merged with Drexel Firestone, a struggling Philadelphia firm whose name carried historic weight. Drexel was given first billing as a condition of the deal, a reminder that reputation counted for a great deal on Wall Street.
The firm's growth accelerated under Michael Milken, who headed high-yield securities. Drexel became known for backing hostile takeovers, long considered taboo among established banks, and for its "highly confident letters" promising financing for such bids. Milken's ability to create a market for high-yield bonds, often called junk bonds, made those promises credible. The firm's 1986 profit of $545.5 million was a record for a Wall Street firm at the time. The culture was highly competitive, with bonuses tied to divisional rather than firm-wide results, and some executives sought to keep close ties to Milken's deals.
Those same pressures led toward serious legal trouble. An insider trading case against a Drexel managing director in 1986 opened investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission and federal prosecutors. Drexel denied wrongdoing for two years, but the threat of a RICO indictment, which could have forced a performance bond of up to $1 billion, convinced many executives that the firm could not survive a trial. In 1989 Drexel entered an Alford plea to six felonies and paid a $650 million fine, while Milken left the firm after his own indictment.
The collapse was not caused by one event alone. Junk bond default rates rose from about 4 percent to 10 percent by 1990, the market lost liquidity once Milken was gone, and Drexel was left holding the bonds of failing companies. By February 1990 regulators saw no path to recovery, and the parent company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the first Wall Street firm forced into bankruptcy since the Great Depression. The episode is debated: some argue the junk bond itself was the problem, while others note such instruments were used in fewer than a quarter of acquisitions in that period.
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