Can we engineer viruses to predict the next pandemic?
In short: To stop a future pandemic, scientists sometimes intentionally make viruses more dangerous in a lab. This 'gain-of-function' research aims to find weaknesses before a virus hits the public, but it creates a high-stakes paradox: the very tools used to build vaccines could potentially create the next global threat.
Gain-of-function research (GoF) involves genetically altering organisms to enhance biological functions like pathogenesis, transmissibility, or host range. For example, researchers might modify a virus to infect a new species—such as making influenza B able to infect rabbits—to identify specific genomic parts that determine host range. The primary goal is to provide a 'head start' on vaccine and therapeutic development by understanding how a virus might evolve before it emerges in the wild.
The field is often categorized as Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) because the same knowledge used for public health can be misappropriated for nefarious purposes. In 2011, researchers at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and Erasmus University Medical Center successfully modified H5N1 avian influenza to spread via respiratory droplets in ferrets. While proponents argued this revealed a link between transmissibility and decreased lethality, critics labeled the work an 'engineered doomsday,' sparking intense debate over whether the knowledge gained justifies the risk of accidental release.
Regulatory oversight has tightened significantly in response to these concerns. In the United States, the 'Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight' (P3CO) mechanism was launched, and a 2025 executive order established a federal funding pause on 'dangerous' gain-of-function research. These frameworks often require a layered review process, including institutional committees and public participation, to weigh the societal consequences against the potential for biomedical advancement. Proponents argue that without this research, we are blind to the 'very real threats' posed by circulating pathogens in regions like Asia and Egypt.
The complexity of the debate is highlighted by recent incidents, such as a 2022 Boston University study that created a chimeric SARS-CoV-2 variant. While the study was intended to show that mutations outside the spike protein determine pathogenicity, it sparked a firestorm over whether it should have undergone extra review. Because domestic controls cannot prevent non-compliant nations from conducting similar work, many experts now advocate for a robust international framework that classifies such research as DURC under international law.
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Sources
- Summary by Intellect · source: Gain-of-function research
- Also: Ethical criteria for self-identifying societal risk associated with dangerous gain-of-function research.
- Also: mSphere — Dual use and gain-of-function research: a significant endeavor with biosecurity imperatives. · CC BY
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